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AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Urgent Need for Atomic Control

by David R. Inglis

1961 Atomic bombs appear to be a lot more plentiful than was indicated by the information available a year ago. This means that atomic explosives are unfortunately much easier to make than we had any reason to believe.

Ever since the original "Baruch proposal" for international control of atomic energy introduced by the United States failed to gain acceptance by the Soviet Union, our foreign policy makers seem to have been counting on the great difficulty of manufacturing atomic explosives to give us time—time in which to improve the international atmosphere before attempting again to bring the explosive atomic situation under control.

For the moment a substantial improvement of the international atmosphere appears to be a long step beyond our current goal of attaining a position in which we can "negotiate from strength." Now it seems that at this late date it will be practically impossible from the technical point of view to design a control plan containing reasonable assurances, because the size of the atomic stockpiles cannot be accurately verified. New and ominous indications that there is a rapidly accumulating abundance of concentrated fissionable ma-

terials give fresh urgency to the problem of devising a more promising basis for prompt agreement on at least a minimum of atomic limitation or control.

There has been no official release of information on the size of the opposing stockpiles, and the only numbers available are those quoted from vague sources by columnists and other newsmen at the time tactical A-bombs were announced. These vaguely quoted numbers almost a year ago ran in the neighborhood of a thousand atomic bombs on our side and somewhat less than a hundred on the side of the U.S.S.R. Whatever the exact numbers, they are so large that there is no time to lose if we are ever to make atomic armament limitation a prime objective of our foreign policy.

The "Baruch proposal" was a very enlightened plan in a period when the United States was the only nation possessing even a few atomic bombs. It provided for quite "airtight" control of atomic production through international ownership and operation of the widely distributed production facilities. The Soviet leaders, instead, advocated essentially paper prohibitions. During the years of diatribe and propaganda there was a slight con-

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vergence of points of view when the Russians came a little nearer to discussing continuous inspection and we belatedly agreed to discuss atomic and conventional disarmament together.

New U.S. Proposal

Now there is a new UN Disarmament Commission, which is considering an "arms count" proposal submitted by the United States last April. This proposal is based on a legitimate, although perhaps unrealistic, desire to obtain complete knowledge of the world's armaments before drafting a plan to control them. It proposes a succession of stages for the disclosure of armaments, production facilities and armed forces, followed by verification through direct inspection at each stage. The stages progress from the less secret to the most secret, covering atomic and conventional facilities at the same time.

In its present form the United States proposal is that the nations agree through a set of treaties to reveal all of their secrets and receive nothing in exchange but the other nations' secrets. Only after embarking on this procedure would they start discussing actual limitation or control. This would be a very reasonable procedure if there were mutual confidence. In this distrustful world, however, it seems necessary to find a plan which does not ask for such long-term credit, perhaps one in which it would be agreed in advance that an initial stage of disclosure would be followed by control of the facilities disclosed while the nations

proceed to a successive stage of disclosure, and so on. Then each nation could know what items of control it is buying with its disclosure.

The whole question of disarmament is a very difficult one, and atomic limitation is particularly difficult because enormous power is wrapped up in such a comparatively small "package" that it is hard to detect through inspection once it has been produced by large and conspicuous installations. Each nation entering into a control agreement would have to take some risk that another nation is hiding a secret stockpile, perhaps up to some fairly definite percentage of its actual stockpile. This difficulty grows as the stockpiles grow. The most crucial aspect of the disarmament problem will be to assess correctly the relative importance of the short-range needs for improving day-to-day security by adequate armed forces and the long-range interest in avoiding the very great risk of continuing the atomic arms race until an eventual flare-up brings about a tragic setback to the progress of civilization.

The United States and the U.S.S.R. have a very real mutual interest in avoiding that flare-up. We must exploit this fact by making it clear through the strength of democracy that any plans the Russians may have for the future which would involve great risk of inciting an open conflict will not succeed, and by devising a control plan generous enough to be attractive to them and still having guarantees, perhaps not "airtight," but good enough to make the risks we would be taking considerably less

than the risk of continuing the atomic arms race indefinitely. The Russians' failure to agree to our original very rigid plan does not prove that they will never agree to a less stringent one, which would still be much better than no control at all. Our policy has as yet not relaxed from insistence on the international-ownership mechanism for control of production as outlined in the Baruch proposal, although now that the stockpiles exist, the production of more atomic fuel would for a long time be unnecessary in a plan providing for a schedule of beating atomic swords into plowshares. Our policy makers thus have a long way to go in exploring the possibilities of agreement to halt the growth of the stockpiles and provide for their eventual reduction.

It is to be hoped that this difficult exploration is being pursued with vigor by the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament appointed by the State Department last spring. Theirs is an enormous job, and the panel will probably require expansion of its facilities if it is seriously to study atomic controls in addition to non-atomic disarmament. It is also to be hoped that public opinion will be receptive to the necessities of the atomic age and will not insist on traditional standards of defense which can no longer alone be adequate.

(Dr. Inglis, formerly professor of physics at Johns Hopkins University and a wartime scientist at Los Alamos, is now working on nuclear physics at the Argonne National Laboratory and is a contributor to the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* on various aspects of atomic disarmament.)

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347

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What's Wrong with the Military?

Among the distinguishing marks of the 1952 Presidential campaign as compared with other recent campaigns is the sharp criticism expressed about the military establishment. The efficiency of the establishment has been questioned by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Republican nominee; by Dr. Vannevar L. Bush, former director of scientific research for the Defense Department; and by Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas. Their criticisms, on the whole, stress organizational weaknesses which, in their opinion, prevent the military establishment from exercising its full power. At the same time one hears in Washington quiet criticism of the authority the military have assumed over civilian affairs, particularly in the field of foreign policy. Whatever may be the merits of these criticisms, it is certain that there is growing dissatisfaction with the military organization.

Wasteful Organization

The most common charge is that the Defense Department and the Army, Navy and Air Departments are wasteful. This is the burden of the complaint of Senator Johnson, who, as chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, has been making a continuing investigation of the military establishment for two years. The reports he issues at frequent intervals point over and over to carelessness in the spending of the taxpayers' money. His most recent report dealt with the deterioration of newly built Air Force bases in French Morocco. A similar line of criticism was dramatized last spring by Representative F. Edward Hébert,

Democrat of Louisiana, a member of the House Appropriations Committee, who set up a "chamber of horrors" showing examples of military waste, especially in buying anchors, tableware and clerical supplies.

The Johnson and Hébert charges anger most military officers, who complain that the members of Congress unjustly single out extraordinary examples of waste and do not admit the possibility of extenuating circumstances in other matters. The military, they say, are constantly under compulsion to act quickly where construction is concerned, and haste leads to waste. Despite the military men's feeling on this score, General Eisenhower drew chiefly on the findings of Senator Johnson and Representative Hébert when he devoted a campaign address on September 24 to the need for improving the military organization.

A less tangible but perhaps more realistic criticism is that the distribution of responsibilities in the military establishment itself breeds inefficiency. The present organization is based on the "unification act" of 1946 and its amendments adopted in 1950. One source of inefficiency in the organization required by those laws is the double role decreed for all but one of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the principal military body in the establishment. The duty of the JCS is to make decisions on strategy and on the tasks of the different services in relation to that strategy.

To make such decisions the JCS should not be involved directly in the controversies and jealousies which at times characterize the relations between the three services. Yet three of

the four members of the JCS are responsible for the well-being of the services. The member for the Army is the Chief of Staff of the Army; the member for the Air Force is the Chief of Staff for the Air Force; the member for the Navy is the Chief of Naval Operations. Only the chairman, General Omar N. Bradley, has no such conflict of interests. His office was created by the 1950 law in an effort to eliminate the problem resulting from the situation where each member of JCS has to serve two masters. But the problem has not been solved, and conflicts of interest between the services dislocate efforts to make military plans, as Dr. Bush pointed out in his address of September 27 at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota.

Military and Civilian Authority

Another source of inefficiency in the military establishment is the vagueness of the union among the civilian Secretaries. For all its weaknesses, the JCS at least makes possible joint planning by military men in the Pentagon. But the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Navy revolve in their separate spheres without formal points of contact. Even the Secretary of Defense has no power to bring these Secretaries together for concerted consideration of their mutual problems. As a result the principle of civilian supremacy over the military is not always fulfilled. The combined influence of the JCS exceeds the influence individually exerted by the civilians supposedly above them. The JCS has a plan-

(Continued on page 8)



The Score in Asia

The current debate as to who among American officials and Far Eastern experts should be held responsible for the Communist victory in China and for the outbreak of the Korean war will, after November 4, still leave the new Administration to weigh the question: "What should be the policy of the United States in Asia—not as of yesterday or ten years ago but as of today and tomorrow?"

Washington is planning to bring up the Korean war in the United Nations General Assembly, which opened in New York on October 14. For the time being the prospect for favorable changes in relations between the United States and China seems remote. Not only does the continuance of war in Korea preclude any move by Washington toward recognition of Peiping and its admission to the UN, but the Sino-Soviet conference held in Moscow during September indicated that ties between the two Communist countries have, if anything, been consolidated. In contrast to Europe, where Russia and communism have suffered setbacks in the past two years, on the China mainland the Kremlin appears to have strengthened its position, and there is as yet no sign that either Moscow or Peiping is in a hurry to bring the Korean war to a close. Nor do competent observers expect to see the early downfall of the Communist regime in China.

Fighting Plus Reform

Outside of the Communist orbit in Asia, the countries which once were part of the British Empire—India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon—have displayed growing resistance to communism while avoiding controversy

with Russia and China. The Western colonial powers, as well as the newly independent governments of former colonial areas, are busy applying some of the bitter lessons drawn from recent experience. In Malaya and the Philippines, for example, the local authorities try to combine their armed struggle against Communist-led or Communist-inspired guerrillas, with an effort to eradicate the principal grievances which have hitherto nurtured communism.

Optimistic reports about this new stick-and-carrot policy come from Malaya, where Sir Gerald Templer, British High Commissioner appointed last February, has initiated far-reaching changes with vigor and imagination. The Churchill cabinet takes the view that self-government for Malaya at this time would be not only premature but would lead to chaos in a strategic area whose output of rubber and tin is urgently needed for the defense requirements of the West. The Malays are reported to accept this view, and the Independence for Malaya party launched this year by Dato Onn has attracted little support.

Meanwhile, Sir Gerald Templer has strengthened the operations of the British troops, estimated at 42,000, the regular Malayan police, totaling 60,000, and the 38,000 full-time special constabulary in an all-out effort to defeat the 4,000 to 6,000 fanatical Communists who, taking advantage of the protection afforded by the jungle, have been defying the British and threatening the country's production of strategic raw materials. Sir Gerald Templer has offered various inducements to villagers who

will report the movements of the Communists and has endeavored to resettle them outside the jungle under improved living conditions. He has also not minced words in berating the British community in Malaya for its racial discrimination practices and its apathy.

Malayan Citizenship

More far-reaching than any of these developments is the attempt to give the multiracial population of the Malayan Federation a national consciousness, which, it is hoped, will check the divisive tendencies that have played into the hands of the Communists. A law proclaimed on September 14 establishes for the first time a common citizenship for the Chinese, Indians and Malays. It is estimated that under this law 50 or 60 per cent of the 2 million Chinese, 30 per cent of the 700,000 Indians and 90 per cent of the 2,600,000 Malays will become citizens of the Federation. This move, it is hoped, will give the Chinese population a stake in the survival of Malaya which they did not have before, and gradually reduce such attraction as communism may have had for the Chinese. The Malays, however, who once enjoyed top priority in British plans for the Federation, are disturbed over the attention Britain is now giving to the Chinese. And the Malayan economy remains highly sensitive to fluctuations in the world prices of its principal exports, rubber and tin.

In the Philippines Secretary of Defense Ramon Magsaysay has been following for two years methods like those recently adopted by Sir

(Continued on page 8)



Pakistan: New Hope in the Middle East

by Jerome B. Cohen

Professor Cohen, of the Department of Economics at the College of the City of New York, has recently returned to his academic post after a two-year leave of absence during which he served as Chief of the South Asia Branch, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State. The views expressed here are his own and are not in any way to be construed as representing those of the Department of State.

Five years ago this past summer Pakistan was born amidst appalling human upheaval and suffering, economic dislocation and chaos. Some 6 million Muslims fled from India to Pakistan, creating an unparalleled refugee problem. Nearly as many Hindus moved out of Pakistan in terror and fear, leaving in their wake grave gaps in the ranks of businessmen, bankers, merchants, government officials and technicians, since such were the roles which Hindus predominantly filled in prepartition, undivided India.

Pakistan's 80 million people were thus divided into two geographic segments separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory. The official language, Urdu, was not spoken by, and was alien to, some 45 million Bengalis, who constitute a majority of Pakistan's population. The raw jute producing areas of East Pakistan were cut off from the jute mills of Calcutta, and the surplus wheat and cotton producing areas of West Pakistan were severed by new national boundaries from traditional consuming industries and areas in India. Under these circumstances prospects for the political and economic integration of divided Pakistan seemed remote indeed.

Yet today the world's most populous Muslim nation has a thriving, going economy. Refugees have been largely absorbed. Alternative world markets have been found to make Pakistan less dependent on India. Economic development and land reform measures are being undertaken by a relatively stable, conservative

and enlightened government, and the Communists seem to have become so discouraged by their prospects for the penetration and subversion of the country that the Soviet Union apparently wrote off Pakistan when it openly espoused India's cause in the Kashmir dispute. How has Pakistan been able to achieve so much in five years and what are its prospects for the future?

Pakistan is a dominion of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It has a governor-general, now Ghulam Mohammed, and a cabinet headed by a prime minister, Kwaja Nazimuddin. Legislative power is centered in a constituent assembly, which is framing a new constitution.

Both the governor-general and the prime minister, as well as Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan, the foreign minister, were educated in Britain and are regarded as basically friendly to the West. When Jinnah's successor, the late and well-liked Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated, in the fall of 1951, the then governor-general, Nazimuddin, stepped down to take over the prime ministry; and Pakistan's leading political party, the dominant Muslim League, to which almost all the leading political figures in Pakistan belong, closed ranks behind him. The country exhibited remarkable political stability and equanimity in the face of so great a disaster as the loss of its beloved Liaquat Ali Khan. Undoubtedly its adherence to Islamic concepts has been an important factor in securing widespread support for the state.

Pakistan is primarily an agricul-

tural country, in fact overwhelmingly so, and one of the world's least—as yet—industrialized nations. More than 85 percent of the population depend on agriculture for a livelihood. Only 3 percent of Pakistan's exports are nonagricultural, and 70 percent of its imports are manufactured goods. Pakistan's largest industry—textiles—produces only 16 percent of a domestic cloth consumption of only nine yards per capita a year. The per capita production of electricity is only 15 percent of that of India and among the lowest in the world. Installed hydroelectric capacity is only some 20,000 kilowatts, against a potential of 6 million kilowatts. Yet the very extent of Pakistan's dependence upon agriculture made the disruptive impact of partition less severe than might have been the case in a more advanced economy.

Primarily Agrarian Economy

Food crops, mainly rice and wheat, account for three-fourths of the total area under principal crops; but with respect to agricultural output, climate and topography, East and West Pakistan differ markedly. East Pakistan, with only a sixth as much land as West Pakistan, is heavily overpopulated and has a serious food deficit. In contrast, West Pakistan is sparsely peopled and yet normally produces enough food not only to feed itself and to cover East Pakistan's deficit but to provide a small export surplus as well. Rice is the main food crop of East Pakistan, while raw jute is its main cash export crop. Nearly 70 percent of the

total world production of raw jute originates here. Before partition, jute accounted for one-third of the total value of undivided India's exports, and three-fourths of it was produced in what is now East Pakistan. West Pakistan feeds itself with wheat and millet, and exports some wheat and rice. Its principal cash export crop, however, is cotton. Pakistan is the fourth largest exporter of cotton in the world and contributes about 10 percent of the cotton entering world trade.

Development Programs

In general, agriculture is much more diversified in West than in East Pakistan. The West is dry, while the East is wet. East Pakistan is a well-watered alluvial plain cut by the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers, seasonally swollen by the monsoons. Average rainfall is 80 to 85 inches, and flood control is a major problem. In the West, by contrast, rainfall averages about 10 inches on the plains, and were it not for the very extensive system of canal irrigation, crops could not be grown. But for irrigation most of West Pakistan would be desert. In the Punjab plains of the north, canals irrigate some 9 million acres, an area about the size of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island combined. This was the great wheat grainary of undivided India, accounting for 40 percent of total prepartition production. In the south, in Sind Province, where rainfall averages but 5 inches, the world's largest irrigation works, the Lloyd Barrage at Sukkur on the Indus River, supplies water for almost 6 million acres, as much land as is under cultivation in all of Egypt. Of Pakistan's estimated 27 million acres of irrigated land under cultivation, 25 million are in West Pakistan.

Development in the agricultural area obviously requires different pro-

grams in East and West Pakistan. In the East the emphasis needs to be placed on crop diversification and flood control; in the West, where agriculture is already well-diversified, irrigation and land development should be stressed, although in some areas waterlogging, because of poor methods previously used in irrigation, has now become a real problem. In both East and West, however, there is considerable room for improvement of yields. While Pakistan obtains more, on the average, from the land than does India, its performance is poor by Japanese standards, as the following table indicates:

Comparative Foodgrain Yields, Pakistan, India and Japan

(in 100 kilograms per hectare)

Country	Rice	Wheat
Pakistan	13.7	8.2
India	11.7	6.6
Japan	37.2	15.8

Source: *FAO Yearbook of Food and Agriculture Statistics*

By the use of improved seeds, an extension service, better farm implements, crop rotation and especially application of fertilizer, Pakistan should be able to begin to approach Japanese foodgrain output levels.

Lack of Industrial Resources

The longer-term development problem of Pakistan, however, is the need to obtain a more balanced economy by expanding the now tiny industrial sector. Unfortunately Pakistan does not possess the essential mineral resources for large-scale industrial power. While Pakistan produces a number of industrial raw materials, such as jute, cotton, hides and skins, on a substantial scale, it has relatively little industry. At partition, the area which is now Pakistan had only 16 comparatively small cotton mills—compared with over 400 much larger ones in India—9 small sugar mills, 6 small cement plants and a few small glass works, tanneries and match factories. It had

no jute, wool or paper mills and no iron and steel works, although there were several small rerolling mills.

Pakistan produces some oil, about 1 million barrels, but this is only one-seventh of its annual consumption. There are no major coal deposits in Pakistan. Coal output totaled about 425,000 long tons in 1950, but this was only approximately one-fifth of total requirements of some 2.5 million tons. Pakistan does have extensive deposits of gypsum, chromite, limestone and salt but no iron ore or coking coal. The abundance and wide distribution in Western Pakistan of limestone, clays, gypsum, magnesium and potassium salts, sodium carbonates, sulfates, alum, pyrites and small deposits of sulfur suggest that Pakistan's next best immediate industrial opportunity, after the processing of its own agricultural products, may lie in the manufacture of fertilizer, chemicals and cement.

The major obstacle to the development of both the processing and the fertilizer and chemical industries is the lack of power. Pakistan has almost no developed hydroelectric power production but a very rich potential, estimated as high as 6 million kilowatts. Recognizing this, the government hired a British-Swedish engineering firm to make a power survey of Pakistan. In its report the company declared that lack of power was the major deterrent to further industrial expansion and estimated that even with limited economic growth the demand for power would by 1955-56 exceed 250,000 kilowatts, compared to present effective steam and hydro capacity of some 50,000 kilowatts. Accordingly, the government in its six-year development plan has programed an increase in thermal generating capacity of 125,000 kilowatts and of 222,000 kilowatts in hydroelectric projects. Thus, if by 1956 the government has been

able to carry out this plan, it will have more than 350,000 kilowatts, a figure comfortably in excess of its anticipated requirements.

Government Plans

If and when the power becomes available, first priority in its use is expected to be given to plants for the processing of Pakistan's agricultural products. The industrial sector of Pakistan's Six-Year Plan is mainly concerned with processing facilities. Six jute mills, twenty-four cotton and woolen mills, a paper mill, a sugar mill and miscellaneous ceramics, glass, chemical and fertilizer plants have been scheduled. The annual foreign exchange earnings and savings from these industrial facilities will alone equal the original foreign exchange investment required, so the economic incentive to carry out the projects is very strong.

The chief obstacles limiting the achievement of these goals, apart from lack of power and fuel, are the availability of managerial talent and skilled technicians, and the reluctance of domestic capital to invest in industry because of higher rates of return in commerce, land, speculation and money-lending. The government, however, is making earnest efforts within the limits of its resources to enlarge the present tiny industrial sector by measures designed to encourage both domestic and foreign capital investment in the country, by tax concessions, by direct subsidization and by the formation of an Industrial Finance Corporation, an Industries Development Corporation and a special Cottage Industries Directorate.

It is unfortunate that so much of Pakistan's energies and resources should have been absorbed over the first five years of its existence in disputes with India over water rights, refugees and refugee property settle-

ment, trade, currency devaluation and, especially, Kashmir. Pakistan refused to accept the accession of this largely Muslim state to India by its Hindu maharaja; and continued preoccupation with this issue has caused Pakistan to maintain a quarter of a million men under arms in Kashmir and along India's western borders and to devote 60 percent of its budget to military purposes.

The energy and enthusiasm, however, with which Pakistan's small corps of trained administrators has tackled the problem of economic improvement and the extent of their widespread efforts in many spheres amaze Western observers accustomed to the lethargy and indifference of other Middle East governments, and almost without exception these observers come away impressed and enthusiastic. While the standard of living in Pakistan is still very low (\$51 per capita a year compared with \$1,453 in the United States and \$773 in Britain), Pakistan's economy has done remarkably well in the five years since independence.

Aside from successfully carrying out the tremendous initial tasks of organizing and maintaining a stable, competent political mechanism, a banking and monetary system, a tariff, tax and budget structure, the new government—with the aid of United Nations and United States technical assistance, International Bank loans, sterling balances and Commonwealth aid but largely by its own efforts and with its own resources—has undertaken new irrigation works, new hydroelectric projects, port development, agricultural extension, new training schools for agricultural and mechanical skills, land reclamation, flood control and the development of industrial processing facilities, such as jute, paper and sugar mills. Of course the world-

wide increase in demand for, and rise in prices of, raw materials following the outbreak of the Korean war particularly aided Pakistan. To this extent the marked improvement in its economic position in 1950 and 1951 was somewhat precarious, since any further drop in the level of world prices would cut the ground from under the present stability.

Consequently, the continued economic development of the country and a better balancing of its economic segments are essential to long-run equilibrium. The basic and pressing needs are to increase agricultural output and productivity, develop power and fuel resources, expand the processing industries, improve transportation and marketing facilities and train larger numbers of administrators and skilled technicians. The present government of Pakistan is one of the most able, energetic and forward-looking in the Middle East. It recognizes that its continued stability depends on economic progress, and it should be helped in every possible way to achieve the improvement it so wholeheartedly seeks. If the dispute over Kashmir can be honorably settled by negotiation and compromise, Pakistan's energies and resources could be wholly devoted to the vital task of nation-building. There would then develop to the east of Iran a bulwark as strong and as determined as Turkey is on the west.

READING SUGGESTIONS: B. B. Ghosh, *Indian Economics and Pakistani Economics* (Calcutta, Mukherjee, 1949); Walter Godfrey, *Economic and Commercial Conditions in Pakistan*, Overseas Economic Surveys (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951); *Industrial Mission to Pakistan*, report by the British Mission (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950); *Pakistan Development Schemes* (Karachi, Pakistan Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1950); *Pakistan Looks Ahead: The Six-Year Development Plan* (Karachi, Pakistan Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1951); Richard Symonds, *The Making of Modern Pakistan* (London, Faber, 1950).

Newsletter

(Continued from page 3)

ning staff of 210 members, and the Secretaries have none.

This situation creates one of the difficulties on foreign policy matters that arouses criticism of the military in Washington. The position-papers which the Secretary of Defense submits to the National Security Council are in most instances the papers prepared by the excellent staff of the JCS. The National Security Council was created by the unification act as a body where civilian authorities from the military establishment and the State Department could reconcile conflicts of approach to foreign policy. What happens in fact is that the civilian State Department is pitted against military officers, and the policy opinions of the officers sometimes carry the day. Either the principle of civilian supremacy should be revised, or the authority of civilians in the military establishment should be increased.

BLAIR BOLLES

Spotlight

(Continued from page 4)

Gerald Templer in his campaign to stamp out the guerrilla activities of the Hukbalahaps. He has improved the discipline of his troops and has tried to win the confidence of the peasants who either helped the Huks or lived in fear of their reprisals. He

has also tried to wean the peasants from communism by improving agricultural conditions. The prospect for land reform, however, is not encouraging and Magsaysay frankly declares that unless the land is divided and the peasants are assured private ownership, the Huk problem will continue to plague the Philippines.

Japan Anti-Communist

Those who feared the spread of communism in Asia have been heartened by the results of Japan's first post-occupation general elections on October 1. The Liberty party, led by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who supports the United States and favors rearmament, obtained 240 seats out of 466 in the House of Representatives (they had previously had 285), and the Communists, whose violent tactics, accompanied by Moscow's veto on the admission of Japan to the UN, alienated the voters, failed to win a single seat.

The political situation in Japan, however, is not as clear-cut as these figures would indicate. The Liberals' working majority in the House has been cut to seven votes, and Mr. Yoshida's leadership of the party has been challenged by Ichiro Hatoyama, purged by the occupation authorities in 1946 and only recently depurged. The Japanese press takes the view that unless the Liberal party can heal

the rift within its ranks, its House majority may prove worthless.

The Progressives, led by former Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu, who served a prison term as one of Japan's top-rank war criminals, benefited by the Liberals' losses. So did the Right-Wing Socialists, who won 57 seats as against their previous 30. The Left-Wing Socialists, who oppose the alliance with the United States and urge a treaty with Russia and Communist China, received votes which might otherwise have gone to the Communists, increasing their seats from 16 to 54. Meanwhile, Japan continues to face the fundamental question of how to make a living from world trade, especially in textiles, in increasing competition with Britain.

The score in Asia is that much can be done to check communism—but only provided the Western powers and the native regimes are willing and able to make rapid adjustments to changing political, economic and social conditions.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The second of two articles)

The Face of Spain, by Gerald Brennan. New York, Pellegrini & Cudahy, 1951. \$3.75.

A leading English authority on Spain, author of *The Spanish Labyrinth*, writes engagingly of his recent travels through that country. The accounts of what many Spaniards really think of their government, as well as the author's own penetrating observations, are very illuminating.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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In the next issue

Where Is Egypt Going?

An on-the-spot analysis

by John S. Badeau, president

of The American University at Cairo

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